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G

ood N atured is an elegant book, easy to read, beautifully
illustrated and moderate in tone. Frans de Waal
professes an aversion to dichotomy and, while he asserts
his own views with confidence, he is rarely dismissive of the
conflicting views of others.
Nothing better illustrates this
characteristic than de Waal's treatment of Richard Dawkins, one
of the most vociferous exponents of the notion that hum an
beings are bom selfish. Although he questions the wisdom of
anthropomorphising the gene as Dawkins does in the title of his
book, The Selfish Gene, de Waal agrees with Dawkins that
genetic self-interest at the expense of others is the basic thrust of
evolution, but he also argues that, paradoxically, in some species,
our own included,
the selfish gene has given rise to
unselfishness, to a natural capacity for caring and sharing which is
the source of human morality.
It is de Waal's contention that there can be no satisfactory account
of human morality without a consideration of evolution, but it is
not the main purpose of his book to speculate on how morality
might have evolved. De Waal's aim is to produce convincing
evidence that many of the tendencies and capacities underlying
human morality are to be found in other animals, especially in
our nearest relatives. He does not claim that members of other
species should be regarded as moral beings, nor does he
undervalue our much-vaunted capacity for moral reasoning, he
simply claims that the foundations of morality have been with us
from the very beginning. We are by nature 'good' as well as
selfish.
It may be appropriate, at this point, to reassure any potential
readers who have an aversion to prescriptive views of hum an
nature and who may be deterred by what they perceive as a whiff
of biological determinism. The human nature of which de Waal
speaks is remarkable above all for its plasticity. Like other
members of the primate order, human beings are diverse as
individuals, variable in their associations and capable of adapting
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to even radical changes in their circumstances. In the hum an
species, this last capacity has been so enhanced by advances in
technology that it seems almost boundless, and de Waal does
briefly speculate on the possibility that we may be in danger of
pushing our adaptive potential to the limit. He leaves the
question open, however, and at no time does he suggest that
solutions to contemporary problems are to be found in the
knowledge of our genetic heritage.
Whatever our predispositions are, it is clear that they do not
provide us with specific norms, for these are far too variable to be
genetically programmed, but de Waal suggests, nevertheless, that
it is helpful for us to be aware of our predispositions, particularly
if we are interested in changing the way we are, for
predispositions may be consciously reinforced or repressed. Being
something of an optimist, de Waal is inclined to the view that, as
in gardening, it is usually better to work with nature rather than
against it. I, for reasons which will appear later, am less inclined
to optimism.
Before there can be any discussion of the method employed by de
Waal to achieve his aim, or any assessment of his success in doing
so, it is necessary to look at what he regards as the prerequisites
for morality. He consistently identifies four basic traits under
which he groups other related tendencies. He is not consistent in
the order he bestows on the traits, but that may be because he
considers them all equally important. It might well be argued that
the list is not exhaustive, and it is also possible to point to
particular human societies which, for one reason or another,
have not displayed these traits. It would, however, as de W aal
says, be difficult to imagine human morality without the
following tendencies and capacities: sympathy, reciprocity, the
development of social norms and ways of enforcing them,
mechanisms for the avoidance of conflict and for conflict
resolution. It is with the examination of these four traits and the
presentation of evidence for their existence in non-human species
that most of the book is concerned.
De Waal describes his writing as alternating between stories,
theories and hard-won data, and he is careful to anticipate and
forestall any criticisms that might arise simply from the form
rather than the content of his work. He points out that the book is
intended for the general reader, and that a single anecdote,
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particularly one supported by an appropriate photograph, can do
more to demonstrate a capacity than a thousand words of
explanation. At the same time, he is at pains to include, either in
the text or in the copious end notes, details of supporting research
by himself and others. He also includes considerable discussion of
cognition in non-human animals and of cognitive aspects of
behaviour, particularly caring behaviour, but he is frank in
recognising the limits of current knowledge in this particular
field. While the work is undoubtedly accessible, and displays no
lack of rigour, there are; however, certain problems with his
approach, problems which arise from its very success. At the
conclusion of the work, the reader is left with a vivid impression,
not of a scholarly argument, but of a series of vignettes. In one
way this does not matter. The vignettes, after all, illustrate the
argument just as they were intended to do, but there is a problem
nonetheless. The problem is one of anthropomorphism, not de
Waal's anthropomorphism, but the anthropomorphism induced
in the reader by the stories he tells.
Most of the stories that de Waal tells are stories of chimpanzees.
There are stories of other species, including some particularly
memorable ones of whales and elephants, but it is on chimpanzee
society that de Waal focuses. This is perfectly understandable. The
chimpanzees and the bonobos are our closest living relatives.
According to recent DNA analyses we share over ninety-eight
percent of our genetic material with each of these two apes, but
the chimpanzees are to be found in greater numbers and have
been more widely researched, both in captivity and in the wild.
There could be nowhere better to look for signs of burgeoning
morality. The trouble is that they are too like us. It is almost
impossible to read their stories without seeing ourselves in them,
and some of us may sometimes not like what we see, as I shall
discuss later.
While I have been careful not to accuse de Waal of
anthropomorphism, he is very aware that ethologists are often
criticised for being anthropomorphic or even sentimental, and
the same criticism is levelled at all those who take their pleasure
in the observation or company of animals other than human.
This means that their observations are devalued accordingly. To
some extent, the validity of de Waal's thesis depends on his
success in rebutting, in advance, the likely criticisms, and he
begins this task by admitting that, in his chosen field of cognitive
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ethology, anthropomorphism is almost impossible to avoid
because the only words we have to discuss animal behaviour are
words intended for communication about people. The very use of
such a term as 'reconciliation' is likely to bring an instant charge
of anthropomorphism, a charge which de Waal chooses not to
reject. He suggests instead that such anthropomorphism, if this is
what it is, can be used heuristically and he quotes, with approval,
the use of the term, 'critical anthropomorphism'.
There is much evidence of primate behaviour which resembles
reconciliation in humans, and there are several striking examples
in this work, including examples of reconciliation brought about
by the intervention of a third party, a peacemaker. I almost spoke
of a disinterested third party, but, if the peacemaker is female
and likely to suffer from male aggression in any conflict, there is a
clear interest in the maintenance of peace within the group.
In order to justify his use of the word, 'reconciliation', de Waal
looks carefully at its everyday use, and defines reconciliation as a
reunion between former opponents following an aggressive
conflict. It is followed by at least a temporary cessation of
hostilities. If the observed behaviour matches the definition in all
respects, then the use of the term is justified, even if the
underlying process is not the same. If it does not, then a new label
should be sought.
It is highly likely that the underlying processes are, in fact, the
same too, for the principle of parsimony posits that if closely
related species act the same way, then it would be uneconomic to
assume different processes for similar behaviour. There is,
however, another form of this same principle which de Waal sees
as posing a problem for him. The principle of parsimony also tells
us not to invoke higher capacities if a phenomenon can be
explained with lower ones, and this presumably means that de
Waal should not invoke complex cognitive abilities in discussing
such phenomena as reconciliation behaviour in the great apes,
especially if these abilities are still a matter of hot debate.
There is no doubt that the two faces of the principle of parsimony
are a source of conflict for Frans de Waal as a cognitive
ethnologist with a particular interest in understanding the
cognitive abilities of our nearest relatives, but I would question
whether the existence of the problem in any way undermines the
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central thesis of this particular work. It is de Waal's contention
that animals other than ourselves behave in ways which
resemble human moral behaviour. He produces much evidence
that this is so, and the force of this evidence is not diminished by
equally strong evidence that human cognitive evolution has
advanced further than theirs. It is still more likely than not that
our similar behaviours have a similar source, and this is
particularly true of the members of the primate family. In other
contexts, de Waal has been quick to point out that our reasoning
capacities do not drive our actions and that we are more given to
rationalisations after the event than to careful considerations
beforehand. It would seem that there are, indeed, good grounds
for the application of the principle of parsimony, but to hum an
rather than chimpanzee behaviour, and if, as de Waal asserts,
there is growing evidence for mental complexity in the
chimpanzee, then it may be necessary to invoke higher capacities
in the explanation of such phenomena as chimpanzee
reconciliation. If this is the only way a satisfactory explanation can
be found, then there is no infringement of the principle.
It is not my intention to attempt here any detailed examination of
de Waal's treatment of the four identified prerequisites for
morality, but I do wish to look rather more closely at one of the
four, the capacity for sympathy. There are two reasons for doing
this. Sympathy is generally regarded as the first of the capacities
necessary for morality, first both in time and in consequence. It is
also the capacity most often described as 'natural' in both
literature and philosophy, and is, accordingly, not infrequently
ascribed to animals other than humans. It is, for example, the
only virtue allowed by Rousseau to his hypothetical natural man,
for, as he says, it is so natural that the very beasts themselves
sometimes give evident proofs of it.
In his discussion of sympathy, de Waal prefers to use the term
succorance in relation to animals. He regards this as the
functional equivalent of human sympathy, and defines succorant
behaviour as helping, caregiving, or providing relief to distressed
or endangered individuals other than progeny. Succorance may
be cross-species and may extend to the long-term care of the
disabled. Succorant behaviour bears a close resemblance to
parental care, but is found only in those animals which form
strong attachments. Even in myth and legend, solitary predators
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are not usually endowed with succorance, although they may be
its beneficiaries.
There is no lack of evidence for the existence of such behaviour,
and it is not difficult to explain a continuum of nurturance,
attachment and succorance in purely evolutionary terms. W here
there is a long period of infant dependence, for example, there are
obvious advantages in association. What is far more difficult to
determine is the extent to which cognitive abilities have a role in
succorant behaviour in both humans and other animals. It may
be that some caring behaviour, even in humans, is an automatic
response to a particular stimulus, while some behaviour observed
in chimpanzees is of such complexity that it is difficult to explain
unless it is allowed that these animals are capable of forming
intentions with the other's interests explicitly in mind. On the
whole, de Waal seems prepared to regard human sympathy as
simply an enhanced extension of an original tendency found also
in other animals. While it is, of course, true that humans may be
able to provide help more efficiently than could another animal,
it is also true that our cognitive abilities may be used just as
efficiently to stifle an original impulse. This fact does not,
however, diminish the likelihood that succorance and sympathy
have the same origin.
Although I found little to disagree with in de Waal's account of
the likely evolution of human sympathy, I did not read it without
some misgivings, misgivings which were not allayed by the
account of the development of social rule and systems of reward
and punishment among primates. If sympathy is associated with
nurturance and so with females as primary or only caretakers of
the young in virtually all primate species, then the development
of rule and order is associated with the male, so much so that de
Waal gives some consideration to gender differences in relation
to morality.
This is not an oblique accusation of sexism, for my misgivings
have little to do with anything that de Waal says. On the contrary,
de Waal makes every effort to show how differences of social
organisation and relations between the sexes may be traced to
differences in environmental pressures, and he is particularly
good at playing the game of the counter example. W hatever
behaviour he illustrates, he customarily produces an example of
contrary behaviour in a related species, for he is interested only in
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establishing broad general tendencies, and is much more inclined
to stress the human capacity for change than to emphasise our
inescapable genetic heritage. In any case, little of what he says is
unfamiliar. His achievement lies rather in producing a mass of
evidence that serves to confirm some of our earlier speculations
and discount others, and he would be the first to admit that his
task is far from complete. The notion of gendered morality is
certainly not new, for it has been the subject of philosophical
debate and tragic poetry and drama since the time of the Greeks.
My misgivings have, in fact, far more to do with the chimpanzees
than de Waal.
In a very recent publication, Bonobo: the forgotten ape, de W aal
makes the following observation, which merits quotation here.
Had bonobos been known earlier, reconstruction of
human evolution might have emphasised sexual
relations, equality between males and females, and the
origin of the family, instead of war, hunting, tool
technology, and other masculine fortes.1
The bonobo is just as intelligent as the chimpanzee and just as
closely related to our species, but it is very different in its
temperament and habits. More sociable and vocal than the
chimpanzee, the bonobo rarely engages in any form of physical
violence and is most notable for the pleasure it takes in frequent
and extraordinarily variable sexual activity, a pleasure shared
equally by females and males.
I do not wish to suggest that we are, or should be, more like
bonobos than chimpanzees, although some of us probably share
some of their proclivities, but I would suggest that by focusing o n
chimpanzee society we run the risk of reinforcing behaviour that
many of us would regard as highly undesirable. Whatever the
variety of human behaviour and association, there seems little
doubt that the ethos of late twentieth century capitalist society is
that of the chimpanzee dominant male. Chimpanzee male society
is a hierarchical one marked by status-seeking, high levels of
competition and aggression, including aggression against females,
and prescriptive rules which are frequently broken. In
chimpanzee society as a whole, however, there seems to be a
precarious balance in the relationship between males and females
1 Frans de Waal & Frans Lanting, Bonobo: the forgotten ape, photographs
(University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997).
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which promotes the well-being of the group. There are several
instances in Good Matured of females intervening successfully in
disputes between males, and of males showing caring behaviour
and tolerance for the transgressions of the young. While I would
not suggest chimpanzee female behaviour as a model any more
than male, I would suggest that we may be in some danger of
losing the balance necessary for our well-being and even,
ultimately, our survival. I strongly recommend a study of Bonobo
to quell some of the misgivings to which I have alluded.
In the first paragraph of this essay, I mentioned that de Waal is
rarely dismissive of the views of others, and he shows familiarity
with and respect for the work of a number of philosophers. There
is, however, one exception to this rule, for de Waal exhibits a
considerable hostility towards the views of Peter Singer, and, in
particular, towards the proposal contained in a volume called T h e
Great Ape Project 2 in which Paola Cavalieri advocate a
'community of equals' consisting of apes and humans. It is a
project which de Waal, who manifestly has great affection and
respect for the great apes, dismisses, in unusually strong erms, as
showing
blatant
anthropocentrism
and
profound
condenscension.
I have no wish to embark here on a defence of either de Waal or
Singer in relation to this matter, but, while acknowledging
Singer's achievements on behalf of animals, I have always been
puzzled by his dismissive attitude towards those who are
interested in them. In the preface to the 1975 edition of An i ma l
Liberation,3 he makes a point of disavowing any such interest on
the part of his wife or himself, and he seems to suggest that
judgments about animals are best made by those of a similar bent.
Such people may, of course, claim to be truly disinterested, but
whether lack of knowledge can lead to sound judgments is a
different matter. It could probably be said that some ethologists
have displayed excessive enthusiasm and scant consideration for
the objects of their investigations. I do not believe that these
charges can be brought against de Waal, and I do believe that
studies in primatology, such as his, can help us to gain a better
understanding of both ourselves and our closest relatives. W e

2 Paola Cavalieri & Peter Singer, The Great Ape Project: Equality beyond
Humanity (Fourth Estate, London, 1993).
3 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (Jonathan Cape, London, 1976).
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may need this understanding to ensure both their survival and
our own.
On the closing page of the book, De Waal predicts that science will
soon wrest morality from the hands of the philosophers. I
interpret this as a rhetorical flourish, but, in any case, some moral
philosophers of the past fare quite well in the light of de Waal's
thesis, David Hume, for example, and I doubt if philosophers of
today will be deterred from thinking about the way things are.
What can be said is that scientists of de Waal's calibre provide us
with plenty to think about.
Felicity Sutcliffe
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